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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, d/b/a 
LDS HOSPITAL, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and MARY JEAN ORTEGA, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 14690 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
COMES NOW the defendant Industrial Commission of Utah, and 
respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing in 
the above-entitled case. 
This Petition is based on the following grounds. 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THE 
COMMISSION MADE A FINDING WHICH IN FACT 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT MAKE. 
This Court, as part of its decision of March 25, 1977, 
stated: 
The major difficulty in this case stems 
from the fact that the Commission found that 
the claimant had a pre-existing psychological 
condition relating to pain in her back, which 
combined with this accident resulted in per-
manent partial disability of . 30 percent, 10 
percent attributable to the pre-existing 
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condition and the other 20 percent to this 
accident. The claimant's testimony and the 
medical report provide support for that 
finding; and, since the latter also indicates 
that continued psychiatric treatment may lead 
to further significant improvement in the 
claimant's condition, the Commission reserved 
its final determination of the plaintiff's 
liability for total disability benefits until 
the treatment is completed. (emphasis added). 
The Commission made no such finding. The medical panel 
and individual doctors and attorneys for the parties talked 
of such percentages but the 3cecord clearly shows that the 
findings and Order of the Commission reserved, pending the 
outcome of the psychiatric treatment and further psychiatric 
evaluation, the issues pertaining to permanent partial dis-
ability compensation. (R-97). 
This Court correctly acknowledged in the above quoted 
paragraph that the Commission reserved its final determination 
until the treatment is completed but incorrectly stated "the 
Commission reserved its final determination of the plaintiff's 
liability for total disability benefits" when it should have 
read "permanent partial disability benefits." There is nothing 
in the Ortega case concerning total disability benefits. 
This Court's action in attributing a finding to the Com-
mission which the Commission did not make should properly void 
the decision of the Court concerning contribution and apportion-
ment from the special fund becuase the Commission has yet to 
make a determination concerning permanent partial disability 
which would allow apportionment under 35-1-69, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. 
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The language of the Court in stating: 
Consequently, inasmuch as it appears 
that the pre-existing condition increased the 
resulting disability by one third, it follows 
that under the requirements of the statute, 
the medical expenses as well as the compensa-
tion award should have been apportioned two 
thirds from the employer and one third from 
the special fund. 
is again not proper because it is based on the false 
premise that the Commission made a finding of 10 percent and 
20 percent of permanent partial disability. 
All other major points of the Court's decision are 
clouded because they would not have rightly been before the 
Court except for the false presumption that the Commission had 
made a finding which they did not make. Such points are the 
question of "substantially greater" and the question of ap-
portionment of medical expenses. Both questions are dependant 
upon there being a previous permanent incapacity which has not 
yet been determined. 
POINT II. 
THIS COURT ERRED IN "APPARENTLY" DETERMINING 
THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO HAVE A PREVIOUS 
AND A PERMANENT INCAPACITY BEFORE APPORTION-
MENT CAN BE MADE. 
Because of the wrong assumption made by the Court in 
Point I the questions involving apportionment were not properly 
before the Court. Before apportionment can be made under 
35-1-69,supra there must be a finding of a previous and a 
permanent incapacity. 
The statute allowing apportionment, 35-1-69 U.C.A. 1953 
reads: 
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If any employee who has previously incurred 
a permanent incapacity by accidental injury, 
disease or congenital causes, sustains an in-
dustrial injury. . .that results in permanent 
incapacity which is substantially greater than 
he would have incurred if he had not had the 
pre-existing incapacity...(emphasis added). 
As outlined in Point I the Commission has not yet found 
that there is a permanent incapacity, either pre-existing or 
from the industrial accident. And depending upon the results 
of treatment there may well be no permanent incapacity. 
POINT III. 
THIS COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION OF 
"SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER PERMANENT INCAPACITY." 
Again, based on the false presumption that the Commission 
had made a finding as to permanent incapacity, the Court stated 
that it cannot be doubted that 30 percent is substantially 
greater than 20 percent, nor that 10 percent disability is 
itself substantial in that it is definite and measurable. But 
if there had been a determination as to percentage of disability 
that existed before the accident that percentage figure would 
have to be measurable before the accident. If Mrs. Ortega had 
been examined before the industrial accident the record is clear 
that there would have been no disability found. There cannot 
be an apportionment value placed on a non-permanent, illusory 
and non-definable possible ailment. Before the industrial 
accident there was only the possibility of a pre-disposition to 
an incapacity. If the reason for 35-1-69, supra,was to encourage 
employers to hire the handicapped and to apportion expenses 
among employers (see McPhie vs. U.S. Steel, 551 P.2d 504) it 
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